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ABSTRACT
The study reconfirmed prevalence of reverse tenancy in dryland agriculture in
Southern India in recent years (2009-10 and 2011-12) as was in the mid-seventies.
Household level panel data collected from six villages by ICRISAT under its Village
Level Studies (VLS) and Village Dynamics Studies (VDS) programme were analysed.
Area under tenancy has increased in recent years, mostly in the form of
sharecropping. Panel Data Probit analysis revealed that likelihood of a household
to be a tenant is positively linked with bullock ownership and large farm size while
age and education of the household head, and dependence on non-farm income
had a negative association. Determinants of extent of tenancy (rented in area) were
measured through Panel Data Feasible Generalised Least Square (FGLS) regression
analysis. Results indicated that an additional bullock increased rented-in area by
0.22 ha. On the other hand, large farmers had 0.47 ha more area under rented-in
compared to other tenants. There was negative relationship between rented-in area
and age and education of the household head indicating that educated and elderly
people participated less in the tenancy market. Input use level, crop yield and
profitability were generally higher in own land than that of rented-in land in the
mid-seventies. In recent years, we observed mixed (inconclusive) outcome for input
use, crop yield and profitability. Reduction of production risks in one of the study
villages has not only reduced tenancy but also abolished reverse tenancy.
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Introduction
Relation between tenancy and
agricultural productivity has long been
investigated in Indian agriculture. Several
studies (Jodha, 1981; Pant, 1981; Radwan,
1987; Walker, Singh and Ballabh, 1988) have
investigated the situation in the semi-arid
tropics (SAT) regions (also known as dryland
agriculture regions) in Southern India in the
seventies and early eighties. The SAT region
has some special characteristics such as
erratic rainfall, persistent drought and less
fertile soil along with high risk in crop
production. These factors accompanied by
other factors such as skewed distribution of
land among landless and large land-owning
farmers had resulted in widespread tenancy
in dryland agriculture in the seventies and
early eighties. Much of the prevailing wisdom
in the seventies and eighties about the land
market in South Asia stemmed from
perceptions about and experiences in
irrigated agriculture, particularly in the Indo-
Gangetic Plain spanning north-western and
north-eastern India (Walker and Ryan, 1990).
Views about the “frozen”, uncompetitive
nature of the land market, economic
polarisation, distress sales as means to
accumulate land, increasing landlessness,
landlords' exploitation of tenants, and
extreme fragmentation of holdings were
common (Myrdal 1968; Ladejinsky 1965).
Earlier studies (Bardhan, 1978; Bardhan and
Rudra, 1978) on tenancy and agricultural
productivity have revealed widespread
tenancy in irrigated agriculture and negative
impact of tenancy on productivity. Due to
inadequate financial resources and lack of
access to formal institutional credit, tenants
were unable to use required inputs for crop
production. As a result, productivity or crop
yield was less in the plots under tenancy than
that of owner operated land. Tenants have
underutilised resources such as bullocks and
family workers which can be used in farming
to increase their employment and income.
Large landholding farmers have more land
which they cannot effectively manage and
get maximum benefit from their land.
Compared to irrigated agriculture, the
situation of dryland was quite opposite. Jodha
(1981) reported dominance of reverse
tenancy in six study villages of Andhra
Pradesh and Maharashtra.  He observed that
large farmers had emerged as tenants and
small farmers as landowners in the mid-
1970s. This contradicted the conventional
presumption, where the tenant is usually
thought of as a poor and small operator
while the landlord is believed to be invariably
a large farmer. In the study villages, 42 to 52
per cent of total leased-out land was
acquired by large farmers; and 56 to 89 per
cent of total leased out land belonged to
small and medium farmers.Tenancy was
primarily an out-growth of bullock power
adjustments and credit market
imperfections (linked transactions with
credit). The study by Jodha (1981) observed
that human labour market seemed to be
functioning sufficiently well, and few
households seemed to lease out land for
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reasons of excess or shortage of family labour
in relation to owned land or because of
difficulties in hiring daily labour. Terms of
tenancy were very flexible and depended on:
(1) land productivity (2) capital availability on
the part of landowner and tenant, and (3)
mid-season contingencies affecting either of
the parties. This was true across villages and
within villages. Due to the practice of direct
linking of output shares to input shares and
because crop choice was largely the tenant's
decision, tenanc y does not appear to
discourage adoption of (high cost) new
technology (Jodha, 1981).
During the last three decades, many
changes have taken place in rural India.
Custom-hiring services for machines for land
preparation, harvesting and irrigation
equipment have emerged with fixed payment,
thereby, some constraints of managing farms
have been removed. Optimum scale of
operation of such changes might have also
been changed. Therefore, two possibilities for
tenancy market might have developed: (1)
expansion of owner cultivation, or (2)
expansion of a vibrant tenancy market owing
to economies of scale and increased labour
scarcity.There is lack of empirical literature
about changes in tenancy situation and impact
of tenancy on input use level, agricultural
productivity and profitability in dryland
agriculture in India. In this context, we have
investigated the following research questions:
What is the extent of tenancy in dryland
agriculture? Has it changed over time? Who
rents out? Who rents in? What are the terms
and conditions (operational modalities) for
tenancy? Are there any major changes over
time? Why tenancy exists? What are the
consequences of tenancy on input use,
productivity and profitability in farming?
This paper has documented the
changes in tenancy situation in dryland
agriculture in Southern India and analysed
the factors responsible for tenancy. It has also
quantified impact of tenancy on input use,
productivity and profitability in dryland
farming.
Methodology
Data: Household level panel data collected
from six villages by the International Crops
Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
(ICRISAT) under its Village Level Studies (VLS)
and Village Dynamics Studies ( VDS)
programme are used. The VLS-VDS dataset has
been collected by ICRISAT’s resident field
investigators who lived in the villages to
periodically revisit the same households over
the years. The study villages fall under SAT
region of south and south western part of
India. Out of the six villages, two villages
(Aurepalle and Dokur) are located in
Mahabubnagar district of Telangana, two
villages (Shirapur and Kalman) are in Solapur
district of Maharashtra and another two
villages (Kanzara and Kinkhed) in Akola district
of Maharashtra. The study villages and sample
households are same as in the study of Jodha
(1981) plus split households from the
original households. Data collected for the
period 1975-76 and 1979-80, 1983-84, 2005-
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06 and 2011-12 are analysed in this paper. Thus,
it is a real revisit and findings are comparable
across time.
Farm size categories were defined in
terms of operational holding and varied
across study villages (see Table 1). Data from
40 households (10 each from functionally
landless, small, medium and large landholding
groups) for each of the study villages were
collected since 1975-76. Sample size was not
proportional to the number of households in
each category of households in the village. In
subsequent years split households from the
original sample households were included. In
case of migration of a household from any farm
size group it was replaced by another
household of same farm size category. In 2011-
12, total number of sample households
increased to 384 from 240 in 1975-76.
Distribution of sample households in 2011-12
was: 70 in Aurepalle, 50 in Dokur, 89 in Shirapur,
61 in Kalman, 62 in Kanzara and 52 in Kinkhed.
Aurepalle Dokur Shirapur Kalman Kanzara Kinkhed
Landless <0.2 <0.2 <0.2 <0.2 <0.2 <0.2
Small 0.2-1.2 0.2-0.9 0.2-2.0 0.2-3.6 0.2-1.8 0.2-2.0
Medium 1.2-3.2 0.9-2.1 2.0-5.3 3.7-8.5 1.8-5.3 2.0-4.5
Large >3.2 >2.1 >5.3 >8.5 >5.3 >4.5
Note: Operational farm size is defined as owned land minus rented/sharecropped out land plus rented/
sharecropped-in land.
Source: Walker and Ryan (1990) and Authors’ calculation based on VLS-VDS database.
Table 1: Farm Size Classification Based on Operational Landholdings (ha) in
Study Villages
Farm size
(ha)
Region
Mahabubnagar Sholapur Akola
Analytical Methods: Analytical methods used
to quantify the extent of tenancy and
determinants of tenancy are described below.
Tenancy is defined as a situation where tenant
cultivates the land owned by another
household and pays rent with cash or with a
portion of the produce.  Extent of tenancy in a
particular year for a sample household was
estimated as percentage share of land under
tenancy to the total cultivated land area of the
respective household. Factors influencing
tenancy such as household characteristics,
resource endowments, effects of farm size,
village infrastructure were identified and their
relative contribution was estimated at the
household level using a random effect Panel
Data Probit  Model as in Equation (1).  Expected
sign and definitions of variables are given in
Table 2.
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Table 2: Expected Sign and Description of the Variables Used in Panel Data Probit
Model and in Panel Data FGLS Regression Analysis
Variables
Notation
Panel Data
Probit Model
(Expected
Sign)
Panel Data
FGLS
Regression
Analysis
(Expected
Sign)
Description Definition
Y  (Equation 1)
Y (Equation 2)
IRRR
AGEHH
EDUHH
AG Worker
DRATIO
NFI Share
LagKRAIN
LFARM_D
-
+
-
+
-
+
+
-
-
+
-
+
-
+
+
-
Dependent variable.
Taken value 1 if
Household is a tenant
and 0 otherwise
Dependent variable
Proportion of own
cultivable land under
irrigation
Age of the household
head
Head’s years of
education
Number of persons
whose primary
occupation is
agriculture
Dependency ratio
Proportion of non-
farm income to total
income
Lag Kharif rainfall
Large farm dummy
Tenancy status
Rented in area (Ha)
Proportion of
irrigated land
Age in years
Years of schooling
Number of agricultural
workers
Ratio of dependent
and working persons
Proportion of non-
farm Income
Previous year rainfall
June-October (‘00’ mm)
Taken value 1 if the
household is large
farm household and 0
otherwise
(Contd...)
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Table 2 (Contd...)
Variables
Notation
Panel Data
Probit Model
(Expected
Sign)
Panel Data
FGLS
Regression
Analysis
(Expected
Sign)
Description Definition
NBULL
PERIOD_D
V1, V2, V3, V4, V5
Ui
Number of bullocks
Period dummy
Village dummies
Error term
Number of bullocks
Taken  value 1 if year
> 2000 and 0
otherwise
Aurepalle considered
as reference category,
Thus V1=1 for Dokur, 0
otherwise; V2=1 for
Kalman, 0 otherwise;
V3=1 for Kanzara, 0
otherwise; V4=1 for
Kinkhed, 0 otherwise
and V5=1 for Shirapur,
0 otherwise
Random disturbance
term which is
assumed to be
normally distributed
with zero mean
Y = A + β1IRRR + β2AGEHH + β3EDUHH +
β4DRATIO + β5NFIShare + β6LagKRAIN +
β7LFARM_D +β8NBULL +β9PERIOD_D +β10V1+
β11V2+ β12V3+ β13V4+ β14V5+  Ui  …..(1)
Factors influencing rented in area by the
tenant households and their relative
contribution was estimated using a Panel Data
Feasible Generalised Least Square (FGLS)
regression as in Equation (2).  Expected sign
and definition of the variables are given in
Table 2.
Y = A + β1IRRR + β2AGEHH + β3EDUHH +
β4AGWorker + β5NFIShare + β6LagKRAIN +
β7LFARM_D +β8NBULL +β9PERIOD_D + β10V1+
β11V2+ β12V3+ β13V4+ β14V5+  Ui  …....(2)
Extent and Determinants of Tenancy
Basic Characteristics of the Sample
Households: As mentioned earlier, the study
villages represent three different agro-climatic
zones in peninsular semi-arid tropical India.
Aurepalle and Dokur have erratic rainfall, red
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water in the ponds creates a problem to the
Dokur farmers particularly during the time of
persistent drought. In the mid-1970s, major
crops grown by Mahabubnagar farmers in the
Kharif, or rainy season were sorghum, castor,
pearl millet, paddy (rice), pigeonpea and
groundnut.  In the Rabi or dry season they grew
paddy, groundnut, safflower and Rabi sorghum.
For Solapur farmers, major growing season was
Rabi (post-rainy) and they cultivated sorghum,
pigeonpea and minor pulses. Akola farmers
used to grow cotton, sorghum, mung bean and
pigeonpea in the Kharif season and wheat in
Rabi season. Cropping pattern has changed in
all the study villages over time. In recent years
(2009-2011), Mahabubnagar farmers are
growing paddy, cotton, castor, Kharif sorghum,
groundnut and sunflower, whereas Solapur
farmers are growing Kharif pigeonpea, onion,
Rabi sorghum and sugarcane. Akola farmers
cultivate soybean, cotton, pigeonpea and
sorghum in Kharif season and wheat and
chickpea in Rabi season.
soils with heterogeneous soil quality.  On the
other hand, Shirapur and Kalman have deep
black soils in lowlands and shallow lighter soils
in uplands. Rainfall is erratic in Shirapur and
Kalman. In case of Kanzara and Kinkhed, soils
are black and of homogeneous quality, and
rainfall is assured (Jodha, Asokan and Ryan,
1977; Walker and Ryan, 1990). In the mid-
seventies and early eighties, there were some
dug wells in Solapur village and limited
irrigation facilities in Akola village. At that time,
irrigation and agricultural intensification in
Mahabubnagar villages were around dug wells
and tanks.  In the absence of irrigation facilities
and due to unassured rainfall, Solapur farmers
faced frequent crop failures in the 1970s and
1980s. Expansion of canal irrigation and open
well irrigation in the 1990s has reduced
uncertainty and crop damage to the Shirapur
farmers in recent years. Akola village
experiences relatively assured rainfall situation.
In recent years, they are also having irrigation
facilities from canal and open well. Lack of
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Table 3: Basic Characteristics of the Sample Households: 1975-77 and 2009-11
Characteristics
Kanzara KinkhedAurepalle Dokur
Household size (Number)5.78 3.85 5.35 4.63 6.21 5.04 5.25 5.36 6.23 4.99 6.70 4.90
Average age of 51 50 47 47 42 47 42 49 44 53 47 48
household  head (Years)
Household  head's 1.35 2.32 1.09 3.25 2.71 6.84 4.55 7.22 2.58 4.26 2.29 5.11
average schooling years
Per household own 2.86 1.40 1.68 1.54 4.12 2.03 4.22 2.04 4.74 2.39 3.56 1.63
land (Ha)
Per household 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.29 0.00 0.64 0.02 0.20 0.00 0.03
rented out land (Ha)
Per household rented 0.04 0.50 0.13 0.31 0.23 0.64 0.28 0.25 0.85 0.33 0.67 0.10
in land (Ha)
Per household 2.90 1.90 1.81 1.85 4.35 2.67 4.49 2.29 5.59 2.71 4.24 1.73
operational holding (Ha)
Dependency ratio 0.50 0.28 0.25 0.35 0.68 0.35 0.63 0.39 0.53 0.36 0.67 0.50
% of female-headed 8.33 15.38 25.00 19.04 9.16 1.61 0.00 9.09 5 5.82 9.16 11.07
households
Irrigable area (%) 12.05 26.24 53.82 70.80 1.09 70.92 0.78 46.12 8.69 32.94 9.19 77.15
Number of agricultural 1.24 0.63 1.31 1.27 1.6 1.52 1.77 1.36 1.56 0.92 1.67 0.76
workers per household
Per capita income 56 744 79 697 84 632 79 456 62 570 101 990
(USD)
Note: 1975-77 indicates 1975-76 and 1977-78 and 2009-11 indicates 2009 -10 and 2011-12
Source: Authors’ calculation based on VLS-VDS database.
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Basic characteristics of the sample
households in the mid-seventies (1975-76
and 1977-78) and recent years (2009-10 and
2011-12) are reported in Table 3. Due to
preference for less children and split of joint
families to nuclear families, household size
has reduced from six in the mid-seventies to
five in recent years except in Kinkhed. In this
village, it  was stagnant at about 5.3.
Operational holding of the households has
decreased in all villages except Dokur which
was stagnant at 1.8 ha. Average age of the
head of household varied between 42 to 53
years. Over the last four decades, average
years of schooling of the household head
increased from one to four years.  Dependency
ratio has decreased in all the villages except
Dokur (slight increase) indicating that now
there are more bread earners than bread
eaters in the family. Percentage of irrigable
area has increased. In the mid-seventies,
irrigable land area ranged between 0.8  and
12.1 per cent in the study villages, except in
Dokur where irrigable area was about 53 per
cent.  Availability of water from a big pond
was the source of irrigation in Dokur. Between
mid-seventies and recent years, per capita
household income increased by 5.8 to 13.3
times. Highest income increase was in
Aurepalle (from USD 56 to USD 744) and
lowest income increase was in Kinkhed (from
USD 79 to USD 456).  Income of all households
is reported in nominal dollars which are
computed using exchange rate for rupees and
dollars prevailed in the respective years.
Trends in Tenancy over Time: What has
happened to the tenancy situation over time?
Has it increased or decreased? A comparative
analysis of census data collected from all
households in the study villages in the mid-
seventies (1975-76 and 1978-79) and recent
years (2007-08 and 2013-14) revealed that
reverse tenancy has increased in three villages
– Aurepalle, Dokur and Kanzara (Figure 1). Two
of these villages (Aurepalle and Dokur) are
more prone to production risks due to frequent
droughts. These two villages are also near to
the rapidly growing Hyderabad city and nearby
district town Mahabubnagar. On the other
hand, Kanzara village economy is mostly crop
agriculture. There is a lack of diversified
income opportunities in these three villages.
In addition, small and functionally landless
farmers do not have bullocks to complete
critical farming activities. Thus, production
risks accompanied by lack of economic
viability for households to earn adequately
in the village and lack of access to critical
inputs have forced the poorer households to
rent out their lands to the large landholding
households.
Our analysis also revealed that tenancy
as well as reverse tenancy has reduced during
the same period in three other villages
(Kinkhed, Shirapur and Kalman). Why the
opposite scenario was observed in these
villages? These three villages have benefited
from the introduction of irrigation through
canals and/ or drip and sprinkler irrigation. Thus,
production risks were reduced. Shirapur and
Kalman villagers also benefited through
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diversified economic growth which helped to
increase household income. Many households
are now part-time farmers. They are able to
engage in activities other than farming.
Therefore, we can conclude that spread of
reverse tenancy is linked with lack of access
to critical production inputs (such as bullocks/
tractors), production risks, lack of viable
employment and income opportunities within
the village for small land holder farmers and
functionally landless households. These are
explained in detail in subsequent sections.
Figure 1: Trends in Extent of Tenancy in the Study Villages, 1975-1978,
2007-08 and 2013-14.
Source: For 1975-1978, Jodha (1984); for other years, authors’ calculation based on VDSA village
census data.
Only Crop
Producing Village
Irrigated Village
Diversified Economy
Drought-prone
Village
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Table 4: Share of Different Farm Size Groups in Tenancy Land Area in Study
Villages: 1975-76 to 2013-14
Village
Aurepalle NA 27 4 69 NA 42 16 42
Dokur NA 17 41 42 NA 22 59 19
Kanzara NA 34 16 50 NA 22 34 44
Kinkhed NA 56 30 14 NA 31 27 42
Kalman NA 39 48 13 NA 59 30 11
Shirapur NA 26 17 57 NA 19 41 40
2007-08
Aurepalle 0 1 22 77 89 7 1 4
Dokur 0 1 13 86 54 7 21 18
Kanzara 0 10 46 44 81 2 13 4
Kinkhed 0 17 38 46 72 16 9 4
Kalman 0 24 28 48 84 10 7 0
Shirapur 0 7 51 42 31 55 12 3
2013-14
Aurepalle 0 1 18 81 79 3 4 14
Dokur 0 2 9 89 71 7 7 16
Kanzara 0 16 36 48 92 2 0 6
Kinkhed 0 30 70 0 19 22 60 0
Kalman 0 20 34 46 88 12 0 0
Shirapur 0 10 24 67 84 0 16 0
Note: * Functionally landless category (Owning land up to 0.50 ha) was included in the small farm size
category by Jodha (1984) for 1975-1978.
Source: Jodha (1984), Table 3 for 1975-1978; Authors’ calculation using VDSA household census data.
1975-76 and 1977-78
Area rented out (%)Area rented in (%)
Landless* Small Medium Large Landless* Small Medium Large
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It is important to know who rents in
land. Results of our analysis of Census data are
presented in Table 4. Contrary to the
conventional belief that “tenants” are invariably
small farmers or landless labourers being
exploited by landlords with large landholdings,
Table 4 reveals that large farmers leased in and
small farmers leased out most of land under
tenancy. In the seventies, in four out of the six
study villages, large farmers had the largest
share (42 to 69 per cent) of total land as leased
in. Only in one village (Kinkhed) small farmers
received the largest share of leased in land. On
the other hand, of the total land leased out,
large farmers received the largest share in three
villages. In fact, the bulk of the land leased out
belonged to small and medium-scale farmers
(Jodha, 1984). Similar situation existed in recent
years. In 2007-08, large farm size groups  had
the highest share in rented in area in two
villages (77 per cent in Aurepalle and 86 per
cent in Dokur) and high share in rest of the
villages (48 per cent in Kalman, 46 per cent in
Kinkhed,44 per cent in Kanzara and 42 per cent
in Shirapur). None of the functionally landless
households in any of the study villages were
tenants in recent years. In 2013-14, large farm
size group of households were the dominant
tenant in all the study villages except in
Kinkhed. In 2013-14, large farmers had a share
of 81 per cent of the total rented in area in
Aurepalle, 89 per cent in Dokur, 67 per cent in
Shirapur, 48 per cent in Kanzara and 46 per cent
in Kalman. On the other hand, in Kinkhed 70
per cent of the total rented in area were under
the medium farm size categories.
Our in-depth investigation in this study is
based on the sample households who are part
of the VDSA regular household surveys. Amongst
them, who had lease out land? In the mid-
seventies, not a single sample household of the
large landholding category leased out their land.
All leased out lands in the mid-seventies
amongst the sample households were from
small farm size category in Dokur. On the other
hand, all leased out lands in Kanzara and Kalman
were from medium farm size holders. None of
the sample households of two villages (Aurepalle
and Dokur) leased out their land in the mid-
seventies. In recent years (2009-10 and 2011-
12), 86 per cent of the leased out land in Shirapur
was from small farm size holding groups. About
sixty per cent of the land leased out in Aurepalle
and Kalman was from the small farm holders. In
case of Dokur, 46 per cent of the total leased out
land was from small farm size category followed
by medium farm size category (33 per cent). In
Kanzara and Kinkhed, more than 70 per cent of
the leased out land was from small and medium
size of holdings. In recent years, some leased
out land were from large landholding
households except in one village (Kalman) where
none of the large land-owning households
rented out their land. Share of land leased out by
the large farmers to the total leased out land
was highest in Kinkhed (32 per cent), followed
by Kanzara (29 per cent), Aurepalle (25 per cent),
Dokur (21 per cent) and Shirapur (14 per cent).
Many of these large landholding households are
engaged in non-farm activities which contribute
substantially to their household income.
Journal of Rural Development, Vol. 35, No. 3, July - September : 2016
Tenancy and Agricultural Productivity in Southern India: Nature, Extent, Trends ... 447
Jr
d 
35
-3
Table 5: Distribution of Tenant Households: 1975-76 and1977-78 &
2009-10 and 2011-12
Village Name
Aurepalle 60.00 40.00 0.00 100.00 23.22 41.07 35.71 100.00
Dokur 0.00 62.50 37.50 100.00 0.00 18.18 81.82 100.00
Kanzara 16.66 33.33 50.00 100.00 45.46 23.64 30.91 100.00
Kinkhed 30.77 46.15 23.08 100.00 70.37 18.52 11.11 100.00
Kalman 41.67 20.83 37.50 100.00 47.06 17.65 35.29 100.00
Shirapur 40.00 26.67 33.33 100.00 92.85 7.14 0.00 100.00
Note: Labour households who participated in tenancy transactions are included with small farmers.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on VLS-VDS database.
2009-10 & 2011-121975-76 & 1977-78
Small Medium Large All Small Medium Large All
Who had lease in land? Among the
sample households, large farm size category
had rented in lands from small and medium
farmers in recent years as well as in the
seventies ( Table 5). In recent years, large
farmers in Dokur have rented in about 82 per
cent of the total lands under tenancy.  About
one-third of the tenant households in Aurepalle,
Kanzara and Kalman have large farms. It may be
noted here that large farmers in Aurepalle did
not lease in land in the mid-seventies. Thus, our
analysis revealed existence of reverse tenancy
in the dryland agriculture and increased
prevalence in recent years. Contrary to the
findings of recent literature on irrigated
agriculture (Goswami et al. 2013, Vijay et al. 2013
and Ahmed 2011) where tenancy (renting in by
small and functionally landless households from
large land holder farms) contributed towards
adjustment in land resources in the society, we
have found expansion of reverse tenancy in the
dryland agriculture in southern India. We have
explored the causes of such reverse tenancy in
the subsequent analysis.
Causes of Reverse Tenancy in Dry land
Agriculture: An analysis of characteristics of
tenant households Vs leased out/ rented out
households showed that average land
ownership of the tenant households (1.04 ha)
was higher than that of households who have
leased out/ shared out their land (0.44 ha) in
the mid-seventies (Table 6). During the same
time, per capita income of tenant households
was 130 dollars as against 51 dollars of the
households who rented out their land.  This clearly
indicates the case of reverse tenancy in the mid-
seventies.  What is happening now? Per capita
land ownership of tenant households was 0.39
ha compared to 0.63 ha for the households who
have leased out. Average per capita income of
the tenant household during 2009-10 and 2011-
12 was 836 dollars against 574 dollars for the
households who leased out their land.
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Table 6: Comparison of Characteristics of the Tenant Households Vs. Leased
Out/ Shared out Households, 1975-76 and 1977-78 & 2009-10 and 2011-12
Indicators
1975-76 2009-10 and 1975-76 and 2009-10 and
1977-78 2011-12 1977-78 2011-12
Household size 6.65 5.20 5.67 4.23
Dependency ratio (%) 65.00 38.00 54.44 34.30
Age of head (Years) 44.02 47.81 36.50 51.80
Education of head (Years) 2.36 4.86 1.67 5.18
Per capita land ownership (Hectares) 1.04 0.39 0.44 0.63
Per capita farm income (USD) 107 588 27 172
Per capita non-farm income (USD) 23 248 24 402
Per capita total income (USD) 130 836 51 574
Source: Authors’ calculation, based on VLS-VDS database.
Leased out/ Shared out
Households
Tenant Households
Table 7: Distribution of Bullock Ownership Among ‘Landlord’ (Rented out) and
Tenant Households: 1975-76 to 2011-12
Year
1975-76 3 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (4) 17 (65) 5 (19) 3 (12)
1976-77 0 (0) 1 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (4) 17 (65) 5 (19) 3 (12)
1977-78 1 (50) 1 (50) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (9) 20 (63) 6 (19) 3 (9)
1978-79 3 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 6 (30) 9 (45) 4 (20) 1 (5)
1979-80 - - - - 3 (14) 16 (76) 2 (10) 0 (0)
1983-84 - - - - 25 (64) 10 (26) 2 (5) 2 (5)
2005-06 49 (91) 4 (7) 1 (2) 0 (0) 33 (36) 52 (57) 6 (7) 0 (0)
2006-07 57 (89) 7 (11) 0 (0) 0 (0) 36 (39) 51 (55) 5 (5) 1 (1)
2007-08 54 (89) 6 (10) 0 (0) 1 (2) 29 (35) 47 (56) 8 (10) 0 (0)
Tenant Households‘Landlord’ (Rented-out) Households
No
Bullock/s
1 to 2
Bullock/s
3 to 4
Bullocks
5 and
more
Bullocks
No
Bullock/s
1 to 2
Bullock/s
3 to 4
Bullocks
5 and
more
Bullocks
(Contd...)
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Table 7 (Contd...)
Year
Tenant Households‘Landlord’ (Rented-out) Households
No
Bullock/s
1 to 2
Bullock/s
3 to 4
Bullocks
5 and
more
Bullocks
No
Bullock/s
1 to 2
Bullock/s
3 to 4
Bullock
5 and
more
Bullocks
2008-09 60 (88) 7 (10) 1 (1) 0 (0) 44 (40) 59 (54) 7 (6) 0 (0)
2009-10 33 (89) 3 (8) 1 (3) 0 (0) 30 (46) 28 (43) 7 (11) 0 (0)
2010-11 49 (89) 6 (11) 0 (0) 0 (0) 26 (39) 32 (48) 7 (11) 1 (2)
2011-12 53 (91) 5 (9) 0 (0) 0 (0) 31 (47) 29 (44) 6 (9) 0 (0)
Note: Values in the parentheses indicate percentage of the total.
Source: Authors’ calculation, based on VLS-VDS database.
Distribution of bullock ownership among
landlord (rented out) households and tenant
households is presented in Table 7.  Lack of
bullock ownership was common among the so
called ‘landlord’ households who have rented
out their lands. Most of the households (about
90 per cent) who have rented out their land had
no bullocks and about 10 per cent households
have up to two bullocks. This condition was more
or less same throughout the study period (mid-
seventies to the recent years). On the other hand,
most of the tenant households (more than 90
per cent in the seventies and about 50 per cent
in recent years) owned at least one pair of
bullocks. Three to four bullocks were owned by
about 20 per cent of the tenant households in
the seventies while approximately 10 per cent
of the tenant households in recent years. Five or
more bullocks were owned by about 10 per cent
of the tenant households in the seventies which
is very rare in recent years. Thus, it appears that
bullock ownership was an important factor for
land cultivation.
Non-existence of a market for bullock hire
services in the seventies are well documented in
the literature and the underlying reasons for the
absence of such a market have been lucidly
summarised in Bliss and Stern (1981). The
situation has not changed much in the study
villages even in recent years. Thus, a household
that owns land but has insufficient bullock labour
to cultivate may lease out a part of its land, since
in the absence of a market for bullock hiring it
cannot hire in additional draft animal services
(Pant, 1981). In recent years, mechanisation of
tillage and threshing activities has reduced
dependence on bullocks for land cultivation to
some extent. However, there are some critical
functions such as land levelling and harrowing
for which farmers have to depend on bullocks.
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Table 8: Distribution of Total New Land Transfers by Type of Land Transactions in
Six Study Villages, 1975-76 and 1977-78 & 2009-10 and 2011-12
Village
2009-10 and 2011-121975-76 and1977-78
Transferred
Area (Ha)*
Tenancy Sale/
Purchase
Others
Aurepalle 64.3 89 10 1 111.92 93 7
(14) (28)
Dokur 80.5 77 20 3 65.67 69 31
(20) (24)
Kanzara 117.6 92  0 8 126.52 94 6
(16) (25)
Kinkhed 87.7 96 2 2 48.62 77 23
(15) (14)
Kalman 257 97 1 2 72.62 85 15
(36) (14)
Shirapur 416 90 6 4 48.85 55 45
(46) (10)
Note: * Figures in parentheses indicate the transferred land as percentage to total operated area of
sample households.
Source: Jodha (1981) for 1975-78 and VLS-VDS database for 2009-11.
Percentage of
Transferred Area Via:
Transferred
Area (Ha)*
Tenancy Sale/
Purchase
Percentage of
Transferred Area Via:
Studies (Bardhan and Rudra, 1978; Jodha,
1981) have argued that agricultural land market
in India is largely a tenancy market. We have
investigated the issue in recent years. Table 8
presents a comparison of the land transfers
occurred in the mid-seventies (1975-78) and in
recent years (2009-10 and 2011-12) via leasing-
in, leasing-out, return of land due to termination
of earlier leases, sale, purchase, gift, succession,
property division, etc., in which at least one party
was a VLS-panel respondent. In the seventies, in
our study villages, every year, 14 to 46 per cent
of the operated area of the sample households
was temporarily or permanently changing hands
through different types of land transfers.
Furthermore, 77 to 97 per cent of new land
transfers were due to tenancy transactions only
(Jodha, 1981).  In recent years (2009-10 and
2011-12), 10 to 28 per cent of the operated area
of the sample households changed hands
temporarily or permanently. Majority of the
transfers were in the form of tenancy in all the
study villages. However, sale / purchase was high
in Shirapur (45 per cent), Dokur (31 per cent)
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and Kinkhed (23 per cent). In all the villages
except Aurepalle, share of purchase and sale to
the total transfer has increased. This indicates
that rigidity in rural land market has decreased
in recent years than four decades ago.
Table 9: Adjustment of Resources Through Land Tenancy:
1975-76 to 2011-12
Year
Availability of Land (Ha) before and after Land Transactions (Tenancy)
After Before After Before After Before After Before
1975-76 1.66 2.36 0.00 0.00 14.24 20.23 4.11 1.42
1976-77 2.54 3.86 1.82 1.62 34.00 51.70 0.00 0.00
1977-78 2.86 4.35 4.17 2.43 9.76 14.86 0.00 0.00
1978-79 3.33 4.67 0.00 0.00 7.18 10.08 0.00 0.00
1979-80 3.03 4.49 - - 4.92 7.29 - -
1983-84 5.52 8.60 - - 8.48 13.23 - -
2005-06 1.27 2.86 13.71 4.20 3.38 7.58 3.05 0.93
2006-07 1.76 3.38 11.14 3.62 6.94 13.28 2.63 0.86
2007-08 1.65 3.20 9.42 3.15 7.53 14.59 3.68 1.23
2008-09 1.63 3.27 11.08 3.99 4.43 8.90 3.92 1.41
2009-10 1.80 3.67 13.67 4.98 3.86 7.86 3.64 1.33
2010-11 1.65 3.17 12.13 4.89 4.73 9.07 3.51 1.42
2011-12 1.55 3.16 15.16 6.55 2.84 5.78 3.41 1.47
Source: Authors’ calculation based on VLS-VDS database.
Per Agricultural WorkerPer Bullock
Tenant
Landlord (Rented-
out) Household
Tenant
Landlord (Rented-
out) Household
Adjustment of bullock and agricultural
workers before and after land transactions
through tenancy market is presented in Table
9. It is expected that cultivated area of the
rented out household before renting out will
be higher than after renting out. On the other
hand, for a tenant household cultivated area
per bullock will increase after he / she has
taken land through tenancy. It was observed
that the so called landlord (Rented out
household) who rented out the land in four
out of six study years in the seventies and early
eighties had no bullock. Therefore, they had
no other choice than renting out the land. In
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those days bullocks were critical for tillage and
threshing operations. Custom-hiring was very
limited. In recent years, tillage and threshing
operations were done by machines hired on a
payment basis. Some critical operations such
as laddering and hoeing were done through
bullocks. Custom-hiring for bullocks are not
available. Tenants have been able to increase
their cultivated area per bullock through rent
in land. In the seventies, cultivated area of the
tenants per bullock was about 3.0 hectares
before renting in which increased to about 4.5
hectare after renting in.  In the 2000s, before
and after transactions, area under per bullock
per tenant farmer increased from 1.6  to 3.2
hectares.
On the other hand, cultivable area per
bullock for the landlords decreased from about
12  to 5 hectares. Thus, it can be argued that
farmers are adjusting the full utilisation of
scarce bullock resources through tenancy. In
case of agricultural workers, such type of
adjustments are absent. It is mainly because
labour market is more dynamic. Workers have
opportunities to be employed in farm as well
as in non-farm activities. Road connectivity has
also increased their mobility to work outside
the village and in the nearby towns. Therefore,
we can say that lack of access to critical input
such as bullock is also responsible for renting
out by small farmers. Similar observations
were made by Jodha (1984) who reported that
6 and 21 per cent of tenancy transactions could
be regarded as "interlinked factor market
operations". It may be recalled that interlinking
of factor markets in Indian agriculture was an
observation also made by other studies
(Bharadwaj, 1974; Bardhan and Rudra, 1978).
Operational Modalities in Tenancy: Two types
of tenancy (share-renting and cash-renting)
were observed among the sample households.
In the cash-renting mode, the tenants pay a
certain amount of money for using the land
for a period of one year for crop production,
usually before starting of the season.  Cost of
all inputs is borne by the tenant and he/she
gets all outputs grown on that land. In case of
share-renting method, tenant shares a certain
proportion of output with the land owner.  The
land owner may or may not share some of the
input costs which depend on the negotiation
between the land owner and the tenant farmer.
Analysis of the extent and pattern of tenancy
contract has revealed that sharecropping has
increased in all the study villages in recent
years. Cash-renting was the dominant mode
of tenancy (in 85 per cent cases) in the
seventies which has reduced to 61 per cent in
recent years in some villages. In the mid-
seventies all rented in land in Aurepalle and
Shirapur was under cash-rent system. More
than 90 per cent of the rented in land in Dokur
and Kanzara was under cash-rent system.
About two-thirds of the rented in land in
Kinkhed and three-fourths of the rented in land
in Kalman was under cash-rent system. In
recent years, dominant mode of tenancy in
Shirapur (79 per cent), Kinkhed (67 per cent)
and Kalman (100 per cent) is share-renting.
Share of rented land under share tenancy has
also increased in three other vil lages
(Aurepalle, Dokur and Kanzara).  About 13 per
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cent of the land under tenancy in Aurepalle
was through sharecropping basis while it was
29 per cent in Dokur and 16 per cent in
Kanzara.
Determinants of Tenancy: Who is likely to be
a tenant? To answer this question, we have
carried out the Panel Data Probit Model
described in Equation (1)  Dependent variable
was tenancy status of the household
( Tenant=1 and 0 otherwise). Estimated
parameters revealed that likelihood of a
household to be a tenant is positively linked
with bullock ownership and household to be
in the large farm category ( Table 10). To
overcome the multi-collinearity problem, we
have used these two variables (NBULL and
LFARM_D) in alternate specifications. Both
indicate the presence of reverse tenancy
among sample farmers. Likelihood of
household with similar resources in Kanzara
to be a tenant is higher than in Aurepalle. Same
is true in case of the dummy for second period
(2005-06 and 2011-12). On the other hand, it
is negatively related with age and education
of household head, and dependence on non-
farm income and village dummies for Kalman
and Shirapur.
Table 10: Results of the Panel Probit Regression of the Leasing
Decisions of the Sample Households
Variables
Model-1 Model-2 Model-1 Model-2 Model-1 Model-2
A -1.4749*** -1.6753*** -0.6610* -0.7089** -0.8190*** -1.0165***
IRRR 0.5173* 0.4740 -0.0984 -0.1310 -0.0480 -0.0663
AGEHH -0.0098 -0.0116* -0.0087* -0.0108** -0.0116*** -0.0118***
EDUHH -0.0351 -0.0686*** -0.0333* -0.0300* -0.0271** -0.0305***
DRATIO 0.0905 0.0671 0.0056 0.0172 -0.0048 -0.0093
NFIShare -1.0770*** -0.8533*** -1.0947*** -0.9348*** -0.9576*** -0.8349***
LagKRAIN (‘00’ mm) -0.0079 -0.0283 0.0126 0.0181 -0.0117 -0.0155
LFARM_D 0.0264 0.8359*** 0.6710***
NBULL 0.1985*** 0.4451*** 0.2897***
PERIOD_D 0.3931*** 0.5479***
V1 0.2565 0.4793 0.0221 0.2303 -0.0094 0.1548
All YearsPeriod 1 (1975-79 and
1983)
Period 2 (2005-2011)
(Contd...)
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V2 0.9267*** 1.1620*** -1.2301*** -1.3624*** -0.5439*** -0.5566***
V3 1.1555*** 1.2761*** 0.4946** 0.2404 0.5203*** 0.4285**
V4 0.5327 0.9014*** -0.2795 -0.3626 -0.1416 -0.1000
V5 1.2326*** 1.4241*** -1.1468*** -1.1449*** -0.5520*** -0.5228***
Log likelihood -367.201 -355.210 -1080.292 -1058.350 -1554.295 -1526.651
Prob> chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 1195 1195 3574 3574 4769 4769
Note: ***=1%, **=5% and *=10% level of significance.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on VLS-VDS database.
Table 10 (Contd...)
Variables
Model-1 Model-2 Model-1 Model-2 Model-1 Model-2
All YearsPeriod 1 (1975-79 and
1983)
Period 2 (2005-2011)
In the seventies, reverse tenancy was
linked with the interlinked factor market
(Jodha, 1981). With the spread of formal credit,
availability of custom-hiring of machines, free
availability of seeds in the market, easy access
to the market through better connectivity and
change in cropping patterns towards crops
which have better marketability and relatively
less fluctuation in prices have eased the
situation to a large extent. With increased
scarcity of labour, it was expected that reverse
tenancy would have been abolished. However,
some constraining factors have been
contributing to the other way. For example,
bullocks have been found statistically
significant at one per cent level of significance
both in the seventies and in recent years. While
land preparation activities have largely been
mechanised and no bullocks are used for
threshing purposes, bullocks are still critical
for land levelling and for intercultural
operations such as hoeing and use of bullock
drawn cultivators. Bullocks are also rare and
custom-hiring is very limited. Usually large
farmers own the bullocks. This is one important
reason for existence of reverse tenancy among
the sample households.
What are the factors determining the
extent of tenancy? To answer this question,
we have carried out a Feasible Generalised
Least Square Regression (FGLS) analysis (Table
11). The analysis has been carried out for three
different time periods: Period-1 (1975-1979
and 1983), Period-2 (2005-2011) and Overall
Period (all study years). Rented in area (ha)
was the dependent variable. In our descriptive
analysis, we have seen the existence of
reverse tenancy and critical role of bullock
ownership in the tenancy market. For
econometrically testing the importance of
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these factors, we have included two variables.
Ownership of bullock was directly linked with
land ownership. Correlation coefficient for
these two variables was 0.50 in the first period,
0.47 in the second period and 0.49 in the
overall period. Because of high correlation
there will be multi-collinearity problem if we
use both the variables in the same equation.
Therefore, we have used the variables (NBULL
and LFARM_D) in alternate specification. In
practical purpose both will tell about the
existence of reverse tenancy if the sign of the
estimated parameter is positive and
significant.
A 0.259 0.471* 0.634*** 0.739*** 0.498*** 0.633***
IRRR 0.1613 0.2901 -0.1497*** -0.1063*** -0.0948** -0.0484
AGEHH -0.0043 -0.0040 -0.0038*** -0.0032*** -0.0039*** -0.0034***
EDUHH -0.0476*** -0.0354*** -0.0074* -0.0074* -0.0150*** -0.0123***
AG Worker 0.0669* 0.0537 -0.0554*** -0.0678*** 0.0039 0.0011
NFI Share -0.2478* -0.4194*** -0.2904*** -0.4211*** -0.2830*** -0.3892***
LagKRAIN (‘00’ mm) -0.0171 -0.0092 0.0090 0.0048 -0.0117 -0.0104
LFARM_D 0.1610 0.5425*** 0.4717***
NBULL 0.1518*** 0.3140*** 0.2227***
PERIOD_D 0.1591*** 0.0749*
V1 0.0236 -0.1485 0.1128** -0.0014 0.0553 -0.0547
V2 0.7647*** 0.6211*** -0.1537*** -0.0816 0.0934* 0.1056**
V3 0.3715*** 0.3228** 0.0663 0.2019*** 0.1732*** 0.2250***
V4 0.3193** 0.1202 -0.2117*** -0.1753*** -0.0658 -0.1097*
V5 0.8075*** 0.7005*** -0.1973*** -0.1974*** 0.0136 -0.0158
Table 11: Household Level Determinants of Land Tenancy: A Panel FGLS
Regression Analysis
Variables
Model-1 Model-2 Model-1 Model-2 Model-1 Model-2
All YearsPeriod 1 (1975-79 and
1983)
Period 2 (2005-2011)
Dependent variable= rented in land in hectare
(Contd...)
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During the overall period, number of
bullocks owned by the household was
significant and positive at 1 per cent level of
significance. Estimated parameter value (0.22)
indicates that an additional bullock will provide
a scope for renting in 0.22 ha of land by the
tenant. The estimated parameter for dummy for
large farm (0.47) was positive and statistically
significant at 1 per cent level of significance.
This indicates that large farmers have 0.47 ha
more area under rented in compared to other
tenants. Village dummies for Kalman and
Kanzara villages were also positive and
significant indicating that these two villages
have higher level of tenancy compared to
Aurepalle village.
There was negative relationship
between rented in area and age & education
of the household head indicating that
educated and elderly people participated less
in the tenancy market (Table 11). It is quite
natural that with education there are more
opportunities to work than without education.
On the other hand, aged people are less
interested to take land through tenancy.
Similarly, share of non-farm income had
negative relation with area under rented in. This
indicates higher the share of non-farm income
to the total income lower the area under rented
in. Households engaged in non-farm activities
and relying mostly on non-farm income for
their livelihood prefer to expand their
participation in non-farm rather than
participating in tenancy. Ratio of irrigable area
was also negative and significant indicating
that households having irrigated land have
better scope to utilise their resource. It may be
recalled here that studies (Walker and Ryan,
1990) have treated one hectare of irrigated area
can be equivalent to 4 ha of dryland.  Period
dummy for recent years was positive and
significant indicating that households with
similar kind of characteristics have rented in
more in Period 2 (2005 to 2011) than in the
seventies. Descriptive analysis has also revealed
the same.
Log likelihood -2103.36 -2116.08 -4816.53 -4902.05 -7201.89 -7257.52
Prob> chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 1195 1195 3574 3574 4769 4769
Note: ***=1%, **=5% and *=10% level of significance.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on VLS-VDS database.
Table 11 (Contd...)
Variables
Model-1 Model-2 Model-1 Model-2 Model-1 Model-2
All YearsPeriod 1 (1975-79 and
1983)
Period 2 (2005-2011)
Dependent variable= rented in land in hectare
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We have observed similar kind of
relationship between tenancy and explanatory
variables except for the village dummy for
Shirapur and Kalman. In the seventies (Period
1) it was positive and in the second period it
was negative. These two villages face erratic
rainfall and in period 1 there was no scope for
irrigation in these villages. Major crop growing
season was Rabi season rather than Kharif
season which is the main season throughout
India. Shirapur has been receiving canal
irrigation since late 1990s. On the other hand,
Kalman villagers have some micro-irrigation
facilities; new crop varieties are less prone to
water stress. Reduction in risks in crop
production in the second period has resulted
in reduction in tenancy in these villages. So the
sign of the village dummies are quite
consistent with the real world observation.
Tenancy and Crop Productivity
There are two schools of thought
explaining the outcome of tenancy. These are
Marshallian Inefficiency theory and Cheungian
(or “transactions costs”) theory. The Marshallian
view argued that sharecropping was inefficient
because it assumed that enforcing the
landlord’s preferred level of effort was
prohibitively costly. Therefore, the tenant will
not invest on optimum level of inputs. On the
other hand, the Cheungian (or “transactions
costs”) view argued that sharecropping was
efficient because it assumed that the landlord
could costlessly enforce his/her preferred level
of effort (http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/
sharecropping.aspx). Review of studies (Otsuka
and  Hayami, 1988;  Singh,  1989;  Hayami  and
Otsuka,  1993; and  Otsuka, 2007) on empirical
literature  on  the  efficiency  of  sharecropping
tenancy showed that the evidence on
systematic downward bias in input  use and
productivity are far from universal. Some recent
studies (Venkateswarlu, 2003; Nasrin and
Uddin, 2013; and Goswami and Bezbaruah,
2013) even tried to establish alternative
conditions under which share tenancy can be
no less efficient than owner-operated or fixed-
rent contracts. Therefore, we have made an
attempt to empirically investigate the situation
where production environment is risky and
uncertain and at the same time reverse tenancy
is present among the sample households.
Tenancy and Input Use: A comparison of input
use level in owner-operated land versus land
under tenancy revealed that average use of
fertiliser, organic manure and labour was higher
in owned-land than in land under tenancy in the
mid-70s (Table 12). Per hectare fertiliser use in
own-land (175 kg) was 6 per cent higher than
that of cash-rented in land and 27 per cent higher
than that of share cropped land.  Average use of
organic manures in own-land was 133 per cent
higher than that of cash-rented in land and 150
per cent higher than that of share-rented land.
Per hectare labour use in own-land (162 days)
was 142 per cent higher than that of cash-rented
in land and 153 per cent higher than that of share-
rented land. The situation has changed in recent
years (2009-10 and 2011-12). Use of organic
manure and labour was highest in the cash-
rented land followed by owner operated and
share-rented land. Use of all inputs (fertiliser,
organic manure and labour) was lowest in share-
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Tenancy and Agricultural Productivity:  In the
mid-seventies, productivity in own land was
generally higher than that of cash-rented and
share-rented land except for chickpea and
wheat (Table 13). Productivity in the owner
operated land was 12 to 172 per cent higher
than that of cash-rented land for different
crops except chickpea. Chickpea yield in the
seventies was highest (237 kg/ha) in cash-
rented land followed by own land (215 kg/ha)
and share cropped land (124 kg/ha). Compared
to the share-rented land, productivity in the
owner operated land was 22 to 220 per cent
higher for all crops except wheat. Yield of
wheat in the share-rented land was highest
(1660 kg/ha) in the mid-seventies followed
by owner operated land (968 kg/ha) and cash-
rented land (656 kg/ha).  In recent years (2009-
10 and 2011-12), productivity of chickpea,
pearl millet, pigeonpea, and sorghum was
higher in cash-rented land. Productivity was
higher in owner operated land for other crops
(cotton, paddy, sugarcane and wheat).
Productivity of share-rented land was lower
than that of owner operated land for all crops.
Therefore, it cannot be concluded that owner
operated or cash-rented land provided
consistently higher yield.
Table 12: Comparison of Input Use Level in Owner Operated
Land Vs Land Under Tenancy
Input
Fertiliser (Kg/ha) 175 165 138 279 270 262
Organic material 12,370 5,315 4,942 4,877 5,961 3,647
(Kg/ha)
Family Labour 74 32 34 60 69 44
(Manday/ha)
Hired Labour 88 35 30 66 67 40
(Manday/ha)
Source: Authors’ calculation based on VLS-VDS database.
2009-20111975-1977
Own Land Cash Rental
In
Share Crop
In
Own Land Cash Rental
In
Share Crop
In
rented land. In cash-rented land,  farmers'  use of
organic manure (5961 kg/ha) was 22 per cent
higher than that of owner operated land.
Similarly, labour use in cash-rented land (136
man-day/ha) was 8 per cent higher than that of
owner operated land. In case of fertiliser use,
highest use (279 kg/ha) was in owner operated
land which was 3 per cent higher than cash-
rented land and 6 per cent higher than share-
rented land.
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Table 13: Tenancy and Productivity (Kg/Ha) of Selected Crops
Crop name
Chickpea 215 237 124 899 1243 759
Cotton 282 172 125 1178 917 1084
Paddy 2130 1906 1752 4701 4149 4299
Pearl millet 173 69 54 490 495  -
Pigeonpea 174 64 118 717 856 417
Sorghum 385 174 101 539 778 366
Soybean -  -  - 1330 1188 1008
Sugarcane 20658  -  - 70859  - 51813
Wheat 968 656 1660 2637 2565 2192
Source: Authors’ calculation based on VLS-VDS database.
2009-10 and 2011-121975-76 and 1977-78
Own Land Cash Rental
In
Share Crop
In
Own Land Cash Rental
In
Share Crop
In
Tenancy and Profitability: Profitability in crop
cultivation is very important. Farmers tend to
allocate more areas and inputs to those crops
which have higher profitability. Profitability can
be measured in different ways. We have used
the concepts of returns to land, family labour
and management. It is the difference between
gross return and total cost for all inputs except
family labour and land. Gross return was
obtained through summing up of the value of
the main product and the by-product. Total
cost was obtained through adding of all costs
for inputs (seed, fertiliser, irrigation, pesticide,
hired labour). Costs of family labour and rental
value of the land was not included. It allowed
comparisons to be made over a long period of
time involving several villages in a meaningful
way. It is pertinent to mention here that rental
market for land and opportunity costs for family
labour is not exactly the same as that of hired
labour, since many people are ready to work
in their own land but unwilling to work as wage
labourers due to social stigma.
In the seventies, per hectare returns to
land, family labour and management in own
land was generally higher than that of cash-
rented and share-rented land except Dokur
and Kanzara villages  (Table 14). Profitability
in the owner operated land was 172 to 286
per cent higher than that of cash-rented land
for different villages except Dokur. In this
village, highest profitability was on cash-rented
land. Compared to the share-rented land,
profitability in the owner operated land was
150 to 350 per cent higher for all villages
except Dokur and Kanzara.  In recent years,
per hectare returns to land, family labour and
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management was higher in owner operated
land compared to cash-rented land for all
villages. On an average, returns to owned land
were 60 per cent higher than cash-rented land
for all villages. In Kanzara, it was 57 per cent
higher while it was 70 per cent higher in
Kinkhed. On the other hand, it was 3 per cent
higher in Aurepalle and 8 per cent higher in
Dokur.
Table 14: Comparison of Net Returns and Returns to Land, Family Labour and
Management per Hectare
Village Name
Returns to land, family labour and management (USD/ Ha)
Aurepalle 48 17  - 368 358 698
Dokur 123 173 235 522 485 302
Kalman 43 24 12 320  - 159
Kanzara 63 29 71 610 388 448
Kinkhed 52 30 34 309 182 253
Shirapur 185 17  - 1313  - 568
All Villages 80 33 30 618 387 339
Net returns (USD/ Ha)
Aurepalle 27 -1  - 94 85 39
Dokur 80 121 119 253 224 82
Kalman 31 17 6 127 - -23
Kanzara 47 22 60 370 223 212
Kinkhed 35 13 21 153 49 68
Shirapur 172 11  - 812  - 92
All Villages 62 22 17 339 170 95
Source: Authors’ calculation based on VLS-VDS database.
2009-10 and 2011-121975-76 and 1977/78
Own Land Cash Rental
In
Share Crop
In
Own Land Cash Rental
In
Share Crop
In
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Per hectare net returns in own land was
generally higher than that of cash-rented and
share-rented land ( Table 14). In the mid-
seventies, per hectare net returns from owner
operated land ranged between 27 dollars in
Aurepalle and 172 dollars in Shirapur. During
the same period, per hectare net returns from
cash-rented land was in the range of 11 dollars
(Shirapur) and 22 dollars (Kanzara) except two
exceptions in Aurepalle (where net loss of 1
dollar per ha) and Dokur (where net return
was 121 dollar per ha, higher than that of own
land). In case of share-rented land per hectare
net return varied between 6 dollars in Kalman
and 119 dollars in Aurepalle. Net return from
share-rented land was lower than that of owner
operated land in all  vil lages except in
Aurepalle where it was higher than that of
owner operated land. In recent years (2009-
10 and 2011-12), farmers received per hectare
net return between 94 dollars (in Aurepalle)
and 812 dollars (in Shirapur). During this period,
net return from cash-rented land ranged
between 49 dollars (in Kinkhed) and 224
dollars (in Dokur). On the other hand, net
returns from share-rented land varied between
negative 23 dollars (net loss) in Kalman and
212 dollars in Kanzara.
Summary and Conclusions
Extent of tenancy has increased in
recent years. Modalities for tenancy have
changed across villages. Cash-rent has
increased in Aurepalle, Dokur and Kanzara
whereas sharecropping increased in Kinkhed,
Kalman and Shirapur. We have documented
the increase in reverse tenancy in the study
villages.  This is quite opposite from the recent
literature which covers mostly irrigated
agriculture.Increase in reverse tenancy in
three villages (Aurepalle, Dokur and Kanzara)
was linked with production risks along with
lack of economic viability for households to
earn adequately in the village and lack of
access to critical inputs like bullocks. Many of
the functionally landless and small households
who have leased out their land are engaged
in temporary migration and commuting to the
nearby cities for work. Decrease in tenancy in
three other villages (Shirapur, Kalman and
Kinkhed) was associated with reduction in
production risks (through introduction of
irrigation facilities), livestock rearing and
growth in non-farm economy. Panel Data
Probit analysis revealed that likelihood of a
household to be a tenant is positively linked
with bullock ownership and household to be
in the large farm category while age and
education of the household head, and
dependence on non-farm income had
negative association. Determinants of extent
of tenancy (rented in area) were measured
through Panel Data Feasible Generalised Least
Square (FGLS) regression analysis. Results
indicate that an additional bullock will provide
scope for renting-in 0.22 ha of land by the
tenant. On the other hand, large farmers have
0.47 ha more area under rented in compared
to other tenants. Educated and elderly people
participated less in the tenancy market. Input
use level, crop yield and profitability were
generally higher in own land than that of
rented-in land in the mid-seventies. In recent
years, we observed mixed (inconclusive)
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outcome for input use, crop yield and
profitability. Reduction of production risks in
Shirapur has not only reduced tenancy but also
abolished reverse tenancy. Share tenancy has
expanded more than the cash-renting system.
Expansion of sharecropped tenancy can be
viewed as a mechanism for sharing risks
among the owners of land and tenant farmers.
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